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Legal Obligation in International Law
and International Finance
David Zaring†
In an era riddled with critiques of the relevance of classic international
law, some have loudly given up on the subject, while others have placed
their hopes in alternative mechanisms of global governance.  One alterna-
tive is “soft law,” and nowhere is soft law more successful than in interna-
tional financial regulation (IFR).  Today, almost every bank of any size
across the world has to keep similar amounts of money in its emergency
reserve, cannot stake its future on complex derivatives or other forbidden
trades, and faces oversight that, no matter where the bank is located, will
be conducted in roughly similar ways, with roughly similar tools.  And yet
the promulgators of these rules consistently disavow their status as bind-
ing law.
These disavowals are disingenuous, and unpacking the reasons why
has useful lessons for how international governance works, whether
backed by treaty and custom or not. IFR works like traditional interna-
tional law in three ways.  It, like international law, depends on domestic
institutions for implementation, although traditional international law has
often sought to ignore the importance of any institution below the level of
the state.  IFR reminds us that the coordination of international interests
comes with winners and losers, and therefore that the “mere coordination
exercise” that international governance represents should not be dis-
missed, though traditional international law occasionally has been criti-
qued for that reason.  And IFR emphasizes the necessarily messy way that
fundamental legal principles are arrived at in international governance of
any stripe— something I call the contestation principle.  These features of
both hard and soft law have been overlooked by both the traditionalists and
critics of international law, but process-driven insights like them have
much to tell us about both hard and soft law, which may not, in some ways,
be so different after all.
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Introduction
We have reached the 40th year of an experiment in international gov-
ernance.1  The experiment was to see if an architecture of global rules
could be created if diplomats, treaties, and state custom were not used to
build it.  It was, in this way, a remarkable commitment to the concept of
“soft law,” which, some have argued, is not law at all.2
What can this experiment, which has transformed the landscape of
international financial regulation (IFR), and, in turn, changed the way
international governance has been done, tell us about international law?
This Article examines the similarities.  IFR, in three distinctive ways— in its
reliance on debate and negotiation for principles, in its purpose as a coor-
dinative exercise, and in its reliance on domestic institutions for legal
enforcement— can help us make sense of what turns out to be cognate phe-
nomena in international law; these phenomena have subjected the disci-
pline to criticism, even though, in IFR, they count as strengths.
Moreover, the forty-year long experiment in IFR can tell us how porous
the boundaries between law and non-law are in the international system.
This porousness is a signal of the strength of global governance, rather
than its weakness.  In a time when scholars such as Eric Posner question
1. See generally History of the Basel Committee, Bank for International Settlements
(last updated Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (discussing the
establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1974).
2. Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L.
413, 417 n.7 (1983). See also Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft
Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010) (conceding that soft law is not law but also
noting that “virtually all legal scholars would agree that [it is] not simply politics,
either.”). Cf. Anthony D’Amato, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for
New Legal Materials: A Reply to Jean d’Aspremont (Northwestern University Sch. of Law
Faculty Working Paper, Paper No. 89, 2010), available at http://scholarlycommons.law
.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&context=facultyworkingpapers (“A
soft law is like a head without a body.  The head knows where it wants to go but it lacks
the means to get there.  Yet a disembodied norm is nevertheless a communication which,
because of its normativity, may be classified under performative utterances”).
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the very use of thinking about international law as any kind of law at all,
and when critics like Jack Goldsmith and Curt Bradley would prefer that
American courts confine it to its most formal contracts— duly executed
treaties— some perspective about the way that international law resembles
other strong versions of international governance is surely due.3
The innovations that have marked the critical, and yet highly vulnera-
ble lynchpin of global prosperity are worth attention in their own right.4
In IFR, domestic bureaucrats, rather than diplomats, have been used to
interact with their foreign counterparts, and treaties have been rejected as a
burdensome bother, likely only to slow the process of international collab-
oration.5  The other principal source of international law in addition to
treaties, the custom of countries,6 has been beside the point, as the goal
was to create a new, robust architecture of financial supervision, rather
than to tease out the legal force of practices already in place.
IFR, in other words, has rejected custom, treaty, and diplomacy: the
pillars and mechanisms of public international law.
3. See Eric A. Posner, Do States Have A Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?
55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1917 (2003) (“International law is not law but politics. It reflects
patterns of behavior that emerge in international relations. But if international law is
just politics, understanding international law does not depend on any special legal
expertise, and should be the province of the political scientist.”); Curtis A. Bradley et. al.,
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 936 (2007) (arguing that customary international law covers a very small
corpus of law, and should almost never be incorporated in the decisions of American
courts).  For more on this latter view, see A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts,
and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); see also Phillip R. Trimble, A Revi-
sionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
4. A well-known statement of the importance of banks may be found in the rumina-
tion of E. Gerald Corrigan, eminent former chair of the New York Fed. See E. GERALD
CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL? FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. (1982) for
the argument that banking is central to economic health, because, among other things,
“banks are the primary source of liquidity for all other classes and sizes of institutions,
both financial and nonfinancial” and  ”are the transmission belt for monetary policy.”
See also Mark Olson, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Annual Washington Con-
ference of the Institute of International Bankers: Are Banks Still Special? (Mar. 13, 2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/olson20060313a.htm (reflecting on
Corrigan’s paper and concluding that indeed, a “strong case can be made that banks
continue to be special”).  The same thing goes for the financial markets more generally.
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the
Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 913 (1996) (“Global capital
markets and trade are now acknowledged to be an indispensable source of prosperity.”);
Hernando de Soto, Left Out of the Game of Capitalism, THE GLOBALIST, July 7, 2001,
available at http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2076 (“The life-
blood of capitalism is not the Internet or fast-food franchises. It is capital. Only capital
provides the means to support specialization – and the production and exchange of
assets in an expanded market. It is capital that is the source of increasing productivity
and therefore the wealth of nations.”).
5. CHRISTOPHER BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) (arguing that the mechanisms underlying IFR are coercive).
6. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 757 (2001) (“Custom is
generally considered to have two elements: state practice and opinion juris. State practice
refers to general and consistent practice by states, while opinion juris means that the
practice is followed out of a belief of legal obligation.”).
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Moreover, IFR has, in large part, been an effective regulatory enter-
prise, one that addressed a problem posed by a productive but risky indus-
try that had started to spread both its production, and its risk, across
borders.7  In 1974, scores of financial intermediaries operated all over the
world.8  They encountered bespoke, idiosyncratic, and inconsistent over-
sight, even on such fundamental questions as to how they should prepare
for crises.9  American banks, for example, held six percent of their capital
in reserve to deal with emergencies, while others, such as Japanese banks,
did not have to hold any.10
Today, almost every bank of any size across the world is required to
hold much more capital in reserve— roughly 8-10 percent.11  Banks are
restricted from engaging in certain transactions the world over, and face
oversight that, regardless of the jurisdiction, has been committed to
approach the job of supervising financial institutions in roughly similar
7. Perhaps alarmingly, “[t]he deregulation of capital markets, the attendant global-
ization of finance, and competition from the internal staff of their own corporate clients
all seemed to contribute to the growth of entrepreneurial spirit within major financial
institutions.” Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of A Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 435 (1989). See also
Anthony D. Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of Global Economy: Community Empowerment
and Global Strategy, 44 DUKE L.J. 928 (1995) (“The globalization of finance and produc-
tion, new technologies in communications and information, new methods in the organi-
zation of work, and the decline of location-specific notions of community are producing
vast changes in society.”).
8. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 657 (1999)
(describing some implications of the globalization of finance); Michael Bordo, Barry
Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, IS GLOBALIZATION TODAY REALLY DIFFERENT THAN
GLOBALIZATION A HUNDRED YEARS AGO? Susan M. Collins & Robert Z. Lawrence (eds.
2008) (observing that there was a substantial degree of globalization in finance as early
as the late 19th century).
9. E.g., Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening Interna-
tional Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (1998) (“Until the Herstatt crisis of
1974, the global international financial sector had no formal machinery for coordinating
national regulatory arrangements.”); G. Boyd Tarin, The Bank for International Settle-
ments: Keeping A Law Profile?, 5 TRANSNAT’L L., 839, 853 (1992) (“Before December
1974, there was no international organization to coordinate international banking
regulation.”).
10. DAVID SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL (2008) (concluding that to the extent there
were formal capital adequacy rules for Japanese banks, those banks often failed to com-
ply with them, and enjoyed a strong degree of regulatory forbearance).  Some Japanese
policymakers would object to this point, of course. See Heather Montgomery, The Effect
of the Basel Accord on Bank Portfolios in Japan,  19 JAPANESE INT. ECON. 24, 25 n.1 (2005),
available at http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/A.Hecq/montgomery.pdf (positing that
Japanese banks had to hold four percent of their assets back as a reserve).
11. The standard is approximate because the capital that must be held depends on
the size of the bank, the nature of its activities, and other factors.  Traditionally, the
global rule is supposed to require at least 8.5% as a ratio between very safe capital and
other assets; the FDIC has indicated that the reserve ratio for large, well-capitalized
banks will be 10%. See FDIC, Letter, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Imple-
mentation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, and Transi-
tion Provisions, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2012/fil12025
.html (2012); see generally, Edward C. Skelton, Mexican Banks Get Ahead of New Global
Capital Standards, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/
documents/research/swe/2012/swe1203g.pdf.
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ways, with roughly similar tools.12
The burdens of this global regulatory enterprise have not fallen
equally.  The developing world has had little say in the formulation of
IFR.13  Unequal treatment has also fallen on banks of some developed
economies.  Japanese banks were left with substantially larger burdens
because of this process than were American or European banks.14 And the
international effort to harmonize and improve the regulation of the impor-
tant conduits of global finance has hardly banished financial crises from
the globe (in fact, some argue that the new financial regulation has contrib-
uted to them).15 But there can be no doubt that those standards changed
the way that banks, brokers, insurers, and publicly traded companies
finance their operations.16
12. These agreements are reflected in the work of networks like the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, which has created the capital adequacy rules that have been
unified and revised periodically since 1988 as the Basel Capital Accord. The capital
accord’s latest iteration is given in Basel III. See International Regulatory Framework for
Banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3
.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
13. Aldo Caliari, Assessing Global Regulatory Impacts of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown: International Banking Supervision and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies,
19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 195 (2010) (observing that the emerging
financial regulatory standard have been devised with “little representation from develop-
ing countries”).
14. A study by the European Central Bank observed that “The original Basel Capital
Accord has been discussed extensively in Japan and some observers saw it as a conspir-
acy of certain Western banks in order to halt the international expansion of the rela-
tively undercapitalized Japanese banks.” Adrian van Rixtel, Ioanna Alexopoulou &
Kimie Harada, The New Basel Capital Accord and Its Impact on Japanese Banking: A Quali-
tative Analysis, in THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 371– 429 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).
The Bank for International Settlements tried to quantify the disparity of the impact of
the Basel Capital Accord for global banks; the institution had particular sympathy for
Japanese banks. See Patricia Jackson, et al., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Capital Require-
ments and Bank Behavior: The Impact of the Basle Accord (Basle Comm. on Banking Super-
vision, Working Paper No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp1
.pdf.  But the losers of the financial regulatory globalization process were not only
located in East Asia.  Belgian banks, for example, had to increase the amount of capital
in their reserves by 1.7%; international financial regulatory efforts and other countries
were affected even more. Id.
15. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293,
322 (2012) (“Even before the Financial Crisis, the Basel Committee’s decision to allow
certain banks to use their internal credit risk models to determine their regulatory capi-
tal was met with significant opposition in part because of concerns about uncertainties
surrounding quantitative modeling of credit risk. That these same credit risk models
were also used for pricing the credit derivatives at the heart of the Financial Crisis only
served to accentuate this criticism.”).
16. 1974 is often identified as the starting point for the IFR system.  That year, a
small German bank— Bank Herstatt— and a small American one— the Franklin National
Bank— failed, throwing the world’s capital markets into completely unexpected turmoil.
See Hu, supra note 7 (discussing the crises); Ethan Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s
Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323, 328– 29
(1989) (citing the bank failures as “crucial in bringing about a ‘paradigmatic change’ in
the attitudes of banking officials” around the world). The turmoil was caused by weak-
nesses in the global payments system; it turned out the counterparties to these banks did
not know exactly what recourse they had, or that they were supposed to be monitoring
the safety and soundness of their counterparties. Kapstein, supra, at 328.  In the after-
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In doing so, the system of IFR has begun to adopt legal principles that
look like those adopted by formal economic legal systems like the EU and
WTO.17  It receives organized attention from heads of state and finance
ministers.18 It has also started to offer regulated industry the courtesy of
procedures familiar to students of domestic administrative law.19
All of this amounts to a form of soft law that nonetheless meets the
standard definition of what international economic law is supposed to
achieve.  The Restatement (Third) of International Law provides that “the
law of international economic relations in its broadest sense includes all
the international law and international agreements governing economic
transactions that cross state boundaries or that otherwise have implication
for more than one state, such as those involving the movement of . . .
funds.”20 IFR, with no assistance from treaties, has provided the rules for
the movement of funds that have implications for more than one state.21  It
is a crucial variant of the “law of international economic relations” of
which the Restatement speaks.
But IFR makes no pretense to be traditional public international law.
As one of the primary lawyers on the committee responsible for creating
those burdensome capital rules has said, rather representatively, “[t]he
Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory author-
ity.  Its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal
math of the crisis, regulators from Germany, elsewhere in Europe, and the United States
founded the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions in an effort to develop coordinated global responses to
the potential for shocks and crises like those provided by Herstatt and Franklin National
Bank. Id.
17. David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 685, 687 (2012) (“Six fundamentally legal principles organize the way that
global financial regulation works: 1) a national treatment principle, 2) a most favored
nation (MFN) principle, 3) a preference for rulemaking over adjudication, 4) a sub-
sidiarity principle of enforcement, 5) a peer review model of enforcement, and 6) a net-
work model of institutionalization.”).
18. As the heads of state of the G20 declared in 2009, “the success of our coordi-
nated effort to respond to the recent crisis has increased the case for more sustained and
systematic international cooperation,” while it was “[m]ajor failures of regulation and
supervision” that helped to create “dangerous financial fragilities.” G-20, Full G20 Com-
munique´, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (Sep. 25, 2009), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/5378959c-aa1d-11de-a3ce-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nQaI4ZhL.  In its 2011
Seoul meeting, the G20 announced its support for the work of the international financial
regulatory bodies; “We endorsed the landmark . . . new bank capital and liquidity frame-
work, which increases the resilience of the global banking system by raising the quality,
quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity, constrains the
build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capital buffers above the
minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times.” BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT TO G20 LEADERS ON BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION 1 (June,
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs220.pdf.
19. Zaring, supra note 17, at 687.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Part VIII,
intro. (1987).
21. International Convergence of Accounting Standards-A Brief History, http://www
.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SeectionPage%cid=1176156304264.
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force.”22  A former chair of that committee has also assured everyone that
“its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal
force.”23  The sort of governance embodied by IFR is, instead, an alterna-
tive to public international law.24
In one sense, it is a very different alternative.  Kal Raustiala has
observed that the sort of network-based, soft law governance offered by
IFR might present international lawmakers with a choice to regulate infor-
mally or to pursue a legal regime governed by the formal strictures.25
Raustiala predicted that this alternative might present a challenge to public
international law that could “reduce the relative importance or ‘share’ of
cooperative activity governed by treaties.”26  Others have agreed.27
But sometimes alternatives, at least in legal regulation, are not as dif-
ferent as they otherwise seem.28  For, as it turns out, public international
law creates a great deal of its necessarily fuzzy content through contesta-
tion, though international lawyers are often loath to admit it, just like IFR.
Public international law could and should embrace its role as a coordinator
of interests, as IFR has done.  Moreover, public international law depends
on domestic enforcement of cross-border rules just as IFR does, a depen-
dence that is often obscured in classic international legal doctrine.29  The
basic structure of IFR, in short, can help us understand what we can expect
from international law, and also suggests what it is unlikely to offer those
interested in effective international governance.
Reflecting on these points of comparison also offers some insights
about IFR as well.  Much scholarship on IFR, and the networks like it, have
22. Daniel Lefort, The International Encyclopedia of Laws: The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS): Basel, Switzerland ¶ 171 (2009).  Lefort is the General Counsel of the
BIS, which houses the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
23. Peter Cooke, former Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
quoted in JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 177
(1995).
24. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002).
25. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 579, 612 (2005) (noting that “the choice of form (i.e., treaty v. soft law) can be
traded off against the substance of an agreement”).
26. Raustiala, supra note 26, at 88.
27. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in Interna-
tional Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 434– 50 (2000) (offering examples of the phenom-
enon); Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms
Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J.  INT’L L. 59, 63 (2003) (focusing on an
arms control case study). For a further discussion, see Gary E. Marchant et al., Interna-
tional Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272,
315 (2011).
28. Franco Modgiliani and Merton Miller won a Nobel Prize in part for their insight
that the choice between creating a business financed by debt or equity, absent tax con-
siderations, should not matter. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
For a discussion on this subject, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 109 (1986).
29. Giesela Ruhl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective,
24 BERKELEY J. INt’L. L. 801, 808 (2006).
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correctly focused on the differences posed by the phenomenon.  Chris
Brummer characterizes it as a return to, and even a triumph of, soft law.30
Raustiala, as we have observed, thought the network style governance epit-
omized by finance would pose an alternative to traditional legal doctrine.31
It is these differences, in many ways, which make the subject worth
studying.
But the distinctions should not obscure the ways that IFR works like
the governance system perceived to be its alternative.  Instead, IFR shows
that international governance, because of its horizontality, its tastes for
consensus and decentralization, and other reasons, can look similar
whether conducted through treaty, custom, or some other, less formal,
mechanism.
This Article explores these lessons, beginning in Part I with a section
on the importance of domestic institutions in IFR and international law,
continuing in Part II with a section on coordination, and, in Part III, con-
sidering the role of contestation in setting international legal principles, a
contestation that is paradoxically furthered by the preference for consen-
sus in both IFR and international law.  The section on domestic institu-
tions will compare international financial regulation to a variety of
international legal projects, while the section on cooperation will feature a
case study on the development of international accounting standards.  The
section on contestation will focus on a comparison of the achievements of
IFR with some selected achievements in international criminal law.
The Article then concludes with a brief observation about the place of
process in international law— for it is in process that IFR is surprisingly
comparable to public international law.  Since the New Haven School has
faded from view, international legal scholars have ignored process and
instead focused on doctrine.  We would be wise to resurrect some of the
interests of that school of thought, if not necessarily its methodology, in
thinking about the future of international governance.
I. Legitimation Though Domestic Institutions
In this section, I argue that international law’s traditional focus on
international interaction between states ignores many of the ways that
transnational legal obligations actually get made.  This is exclusively the
case for IFR, but is more commonly the case than one might expect in
traditional public international law.  Understanding the way that IFR
achieves its legitimacy— through a series of domestic processes, rather than
through an international one gleaned from state practice and treaty com-
mitment— offers a perspective on public international law that can draw
attention away from the old problematic categorization of sources, and
towards the way that real obligation of international commitments is felt by
states.
30. BRUMMER, supra note 5.
31. RAUSTIALA, supra note 26.
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A. The Traditional International Law View
The defining “lawness” of international law is supposed to come
through its recognition as such by states.32  This rather magical nature of
this elevation to legal obligation has often mystified observers, and made
the communicants of the old time international law religion firm believers
in transubstantiation— the change of discretionary acts to evidence of legal
compliance, and therefore of the existence of law itself.33
Particularly in the case of custom— where states comply with their
legal obligations not because of some explicit treaty or contractual commit-
ment, but rather because of a more diffuse sense that they, through their
actions, recognize the commitment to be a legally binding one— the
moment at which inclination turns into legal obligation is awfully difficult
to discern.34
Consider the Supreme Court’s view on customary international law in The
Paquete Habana.35  As the court famously observed: Like all of the laws of
nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities . . . . [I]t
is recognition of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind
these rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation.36
The language is famous but quite difficult to pin down.  The search is for
state-level “common consent,” although it is not always easy to know how
that consent, evidenced by the conduct of the amalgam of actors known as
the state, would be expressed.  Understanding that consent exists because
of a sense— again, by the state itself— of “general obligation” is just as tricky
to pin down.
32. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 32(1).  The statute is generally
thought to be the best statement of the traditional sources of international law.  As Jenny
Martinez has explained,
Article 38 of the ICJ’s statute (which provides the canonical list of sources of
international law, and is generally followed by other courts as well) directs the
court to apply treaties, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law,” and “the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.” It lists judicial decisions— along with “teachings of the most qualified
publicists of the various nations”— as a “subsidiary” means for determining the
content of international law.
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 482– 83
(2003).
33. Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
705, 740 (1988) (“The excommunicate priest who elevates the host before the altar in a
fraudulent Eucharist is left holding only bread and wine because his invalid orders can-
not effect the miracle of transubstantiation.”).
34. There is some debate on the question, however.  As Catherine Powell has
observed, “In response to revisionist critics who claim federal courts are restricted from
interpreting customary international law on federalism grounds, scholars who follow
the traditional approach have defended the authority of federal courts in interpreting
customary international law.” Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Pos-
sibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
245, 283– 84 (2001). What is clear is that the boundary between custom and obligation
is awfully hard to discern, and Powell’s positive account of it is so carefully done as to
amount to some evidence about the countervailing case.
35. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
36. Id. at 711.
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It is accordingly unsurprising that the evidence resorted to in The
Paquette Habana to discern opinio juris by the states looks quite selectively
done.  To discern evidence of custom, the Court examined orders issued by
English King Henry IV in the early 15th century during a war with France,
a treaty made between the Holy Roman Empire and France in the 16th
century, treaties between the United States, Prussia, and Mexico, a British
case concerning a Dutch fishing vessels, and Japanese state practice in rela-
tion to Chinese vessels.37
It all appears to be quite ad hoc, and hardly comprehensive.  As with
any kind of precedent selection, suspicions of selection bias and aggressive
interpretation rear their heads.38
For these reasons, customary international law, with its uncomforta-
bly pliable methods of discerning state practice, has become the sort of
international law most likely to be assaulted by critics of the enterprise.39
While few international lawyers doubt that custom is something on which
nations rely in some cases— if the United States was not able to rely on
customary international law as a mechanism to give it some consistent
approach to treaty interpretation consistent with that set forth in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, then it would have a difficult
time concluding treaties of any sort40— custom is international law at its
most mysterious.
But even treaties, though more straightforward to limn, turn on diffi-
cult contract-like questions as to whether there has been a meeting of the
minds between the states— as if states had minds.41  It is just as difficult to
attribute a purpose to a state, though treaties are regularly interpreted to
give effect to those purposes.42  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, the canonical statement of how international lawyers are
37. Id.
38. Indeed, it is fair to say that, given the broad array of data sources that can reveal
the state practice so critical for interpreting opinio juris, some of the discomfort with the
doctrine is attributable to the hard-to-pin-down evidence of it.
39. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary Interna-
tional Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 191, 200 (2001) (citing that “[b]oth the theory and the
case studies [suggest] that the behaviors associated with [customary international law]
evinced little real multilateral cooperation”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Under-
standing the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (2000) (lamenting international law’s lack of “independent
normative force”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (emphasizing the role of state self-interest in
the formation and development of customary international law).
40. While the United States is not a signatory to the VCLT, its diplomats have said
that much of the treaty’s provisions “constitute customary international law on the law
of treaties.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http:// www
.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
41. See Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties As Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 857 (2007) (admitting that “the notion of
overlapping consent or a “meeting of the minds” may be as much a legal fiction in the
treaty context”).
42. For a critique of the effort to try to discern the object and purpose of the treaty
by looking to state practice, see George Letsas, Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for
the International Lawyer, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 509, 512 (2010).
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supposed to approach the task of treaty interpretation, provides that “[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”43  But the purpose behind Russia or Bra-
zil’s decision to enter into an international compact is always unlikely to be
clear. Even the object of a treaty, assuming it is derived from the meeting of
the “minds” of two duly recognized polities, is always unlikely to be any-
thing other than difficult to discern.
Interpreting the regard states have for jus cogens is an even more
fraught exercise.44  These preemptory norms are essentially supercharged
customary norms from which derogation is not permitted;45 they are also
principles of international law accepted by the international community,
and, as such, are subject to all of the interpretive difficulties of custom,
albeit with even fiercer debates as to which norms, precisely, have arisen to
the exalted status of preemptory.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law mentions prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture, but
hard-headed lawyers might wonder how often at least two of those norms
are honored in the breach.46  The International Law Committee admitted
in 1963 that “there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which
to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus
cogens.”47
In each of these cases, much of the interpretive difficulty involves try-
ing to think about what a state is thinking.  Of course, states don’t think;
the people serving them think, negotiate treaties, take actions that they
believe to be legally required, and so on.  As Peter Malanczuk observes,
“[t]here is clearly something artificial about trying to analyze the psychol-
ogy of collective entities such as states.”48
But the bind would appear to be a difficult one to escape.  Classical
international law doctrine is based on a recognition of the modern sover-
eign state as the only subject of international law.49  That system has, of
course, changed with the advent of human rights and investor protections
of individual claims, which make substate actors worthy of the attention of
public international law.50  But still the state remains central in interna-
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31– 1, May 23, 1969 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
44. Jus cogens is the Latin term for non-derogable principles of international law.
45. Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common
Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 237 (2010) (surveying this
field).
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702, cmt n. (noting that
“[n]ot all human rights norms are peremptory norms”).
47. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 16, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/107. For a discussion, and an effort to move towards more specificity in jus
cogens, see Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE
J. INT’L L. 331, 337 (2009).
48. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44
(7th ed. 1997).
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id.
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tional legal efforts, or at least so it has long been argued by
traditionalists.51
B. The Approach in IFR
Observers of international financial regulation do not spend their
time wondering what France “believes” or what the United States “wants”
from a capital adequacy arrangement. In IFR, legitimation does not happen
mysteriously on the international level, where the difference between
“legal” and “not legal” is often reflected by descending into the subcon-
scious of a state and the reasons for its compliance with or disregard of a
particular principle of international relations IFR is never legal once agreed
to in Basel, Switzerland, or by a resolution of the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissioners. As Daniel Lefort, the General Counsel of
the Bank for International Settlements has observed, “IFR formulates broad
supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best
practices in the expectation that individual authorities will take steps to
implement them through detailed arrangements— statutory or otherwise—
which are best suited to their own national systems.”52 In other words, it
obtains its legitimation through domestic institutions— through the agen-
cies that, once they agree on an international standard, go home and imple-
ment the standard.53
If anything, IFR has taken the domestic legalization component of
what it does to an extreme.  While international financial policymakers
tend to disclaim what they do as legally binding as loudly as Lefort does
across the spectrum of market regulation, the domestic component has
been elevated in the very way that IFR is celebrated.
It relies, for example, upon peer review to ensure compliance with its
mandates— a policy that itself suggests the importance of the domestic role
in the peers that are being reviewed.54
Peer review as practiced by the financial regulatory networks is review
of agencies by other agencies.  It involves some invited visitation, the peru-
sal of reports prepared by countries that have joined the organization, and
some free-riding on the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) anal-
yses conducted by the International Monetary Fund.55  But the way it
51. Id.
52. See Lefort, supra note 22 a t ¶ 172. R
53. Id.
54. For a discussion of peer review, see Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in
Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 341, 369 (1999).
55. For evaluations of peer review in other contexts, see, e.g., Lars Noah, Peer Review
and Regulatory Reform, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,606 (2000) (“[E]ssentially everyone
applauds the idea of using independent peer review in the regulatory process.”); Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Convention on Pri-
vate International Law, Oct. 25, 1980; see also Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty
Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 322 (2013).For a discus-
sion of the FSAP, Richard Gordon has a comprehensive overview:
The purpose of the FSAP was to identify strengths and vulnerabilities of a coun-
try’s financial sector, in part by assessing its compliance with key international
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works— domestic regulators reviewing other domestic regulators to see
whether they are meeting their international commitments— underscores
that even the international interactions of financial regulators are premised
on their taking domestic acts.
The attachment in IFR to the principle of subsidiarity, with its attend-
ant preference for action by smaller units of government where possible,
also illustrates the importance of domestic institutions.56  Subsidiarity is
an essential feature of the soft law institutions of IFR.57 Because the finan-
cial regulators who participate in IFR cannot hope to mandate global stan-
dards— an occupational hazard of entities unwilling to go through the
formal process of institutionalization through a treaty and accordingly ever
willing to claim that they are not lawmakers— they can only agree on them,
and rely on their members to do the hard work of enforcement and
implementation.
The reliance on municipal law is clear, but it does not make IFR a
global governance outlier.  A great deal of formal, public international law
turns on legitimation through domestic institutions.  Consider the follow-
ing implications posed by the way that hard and soft law look alike in their
embrace of domestic institutions.
1. Subsidiarity
By relying on domestic agencies to implement international agree-
ments— and by constantly reiterating that it is through domestic implemen-
tation alone in which legal legitimacy lies— international financial
regulation has made a particularly strong commitment to a particular kind
of delegation.58  While the European Union is famous for institutionalizing
“subsidiarity,” or the delegation of decision-making away from Brussels
and to the states and provinces, IFR practices it particularly eagerly when it
comes to the implementation of its rules.59
In Europe, the principle of subsidiarity is part of the treaty establish-
financial standards, such as the Basel Core Principles and related standards on
insurance and securities regulations. The IMF and World Bank agreed that they
should divide assessment work between them based on their areas of compe-
tence, with some being exclusively IMF, others exclusively World Bank, and
others being of joint responsibility. Basel Core Principle assessments were to be
the responsibility of the IMF.
Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and
Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 553 (2010).
56. For an early treatment of EU subsidiarity, see Kees Van Kersbergen & Bertjan
Verbeek, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union, 32 J. COMMON MARKET STUD.
2, 215 (1994) available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
5965.1994.tb00494.x/abstract.
57. For a discussion of subsidiarity’s implications in a regulatory context, see Elea-
nor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911, 912 (2003)
(arguing that horizontal networks can work with the WTO to create a system of interna-
tionally harmonized antitrust in a way that honors subsidiarity).
58. Edward Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of
Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
59. The principle of subsidiarity, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0017_en.htm.
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ing the European Community in Amsterdam.60  No less a Europeanist than
Sir Leon Britton suggested that the principle, while in theory designed to
reduce the power of Europe writ large, was “one of the most important
modifications to the Community’s constitution since 1957.”61  Sub-
sidiarity is meant to push the source of regulation to the most local level
possible, and, in particular, keep it out of Brussels, unless, “by reason of
the scale or effects of the proposed action, [can] be better achieved at
Union level.”62
Moreover, like subsidiarity in IFR, the EU variant is meant to leave the
work of policy implementation to the agencies within each member coun-
try when Brussels does act; in those cases, EU Directives are to provide a
“legislative template;” once issued, they vest broad discretion in Member
States to implement the basic tenets in whatever forms and by whatever
methods the Member States deem fit.63
But there is quite a bit of this sort of subsidiarity in traditional interna-
tional law, too, and it is not only found in Europe.  In the Medellin case, the
Supreme Court found that local preferences on domestic criminal law
could even trump that of the International Court of Justice, which the fed-
eral government chose, mildly, to heed, but which lawyers in the state of
Texas entirely ignored.64  Despite no particularly ideological leanings in
the practice, some conservative legal commentators have identified succor
in some transnational, but particularly federalist principles to interna-
tional policies adopted by states and localities.65  The tolerance of the
60. See Bjørn Møller, The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional
and Subregional Organisations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa 31 (Danish Inst.
for Int’l Studies Working Paper No. 2005/4, 2005), available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/
serviceengine/Files/ISN/18629/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/d2bffdb0-cb
33-425e-be5c-4a63a607a468/en/pros_and_cons_subsidiarity.pdf.
61. Speech by Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-Pres. of the European Communities, Sub-
sidiarity in the Constitution of the European Community, Robert Schuman Lecture,
European University Institute (June 11, 1992), in Europe Doc. No. 1786.
62. Understanding the WTO: The Organization - Whose WTO is it anyway?, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm
(Last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The WTO is ‘member-driven’, with decisions taken by
consensus among all member governments.”); Groups in the Negotiations, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm
(Last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (Listing member coalitions within the WTO).
63. Swaine, supra note 62, at 10– 11.
64. For a news story on the Texas perspective in the Medellin case, see Mark Whit-
tington, Ted Cruz Touts Role in Medellin Supreme Court Case, YAHOO NEWS, (Mar. 21,
2012), http://article.wn.com/view/2012/03/21/Ted_Cruz_Touts_Role_in_Medellin_Sup
reme_Court_Case/.
65. See, e.g., Nancy Alexander, Saved by the States? The Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations, Federal Government Shortcomings, and Oregon’s Rescue, 15 Lewis & Clark
L. REV. 819, 841– 42 (2011) (discussing the federal government’s inability to control
state compliance with U.S. consular notification obligations in the wake of the Medellin
holding and noting that, despite this deficiency, state legislatures such as Oregon’s have
taken measures to ensure regulatory bodies are aware of their obligations under applica-
ble treaties); Hathaway, supra note 55, at 322 (discussing state-level application of treaty
obligations and positing that the implementation takes three general forms: voluntary
enactment where the U.S. has not enforced a treaty against the states; concurrent enact-
ment where state legislation works in tandem with federal implementing laws, or inde-
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engagement of these states and localities with international conventions
and the like is another way that subsidiarity plays an important role in
international law implementation in the United States, as is the reliance on
local institutions— family courts, for example— for the observance of inter-
national treaties like the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction.66
The European Union, as we have noted, is deeply committed to sub-
sidiarity, as the delegation of European law to enforcement and implemen-
tation by national courts and agencies is a hallmark of the international
economic arrangement.67  But it is not the only international organization
that has made this sort of commitment.  Subsidiarity is a principle implic-
itly adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),68 the
pendently of the United States where it is not a party to the treaty at all); Julian G. Ku,
Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2383 (2006) (“For a variety of reasons,
both legal and political, state governors will retain some measure of independent discre-
tion to exercise their powers in ways that might affect and indeed determine aspects of
U.S. foreign policy.”); Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 461 (2004)  (“the states
already control how and whether the United States will comply with certain obligations
under international law”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs:
The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341,
369 (1999) (taking an originalist approach to the role of states in foreign affairs). The
Supreme Court has tended to be relatively hostile to such exercises by the states, though
the executive branch has been more passive. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 331 (1937) (“Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised
without regard to state laws or policies.”).
66. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Con-
vention on Private International Law, Oct. 25, 1980; see also Hathaway et al.,, supra note
55, at 322 (noting that numerous states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Enforcement Act, under which they are able to execute the terms of the Convention at
the state level).
67. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5,
Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 46 [hereinafter EC Treaty] available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF (“In
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved
by the Community”).  For a discussion, see Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State
Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1678 (2002); see also Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibil-
ity: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 825 (2004)  (“In the
European Union, for example, the idea of subsidiarity, even when not judicially
enforced, may provide a self-regulative political ideal that furthers liberal fidelity by fos-
tering interaction between the Community and the member states about the needs of the
system as a whole.”); Swaine, supra note 58, at 5.
68. See, e.g., Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law:
Challenges to Evolution Under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 268,
280 (2011) (describing the Association as “highly dependent on Member State govern-
ments for funding and operational implementation, nonetheless recognize[ing] sub-
sidiarity in agenda setting, information dissemination, and performance monitoring
with counterpart administrative agencies and civil society groups in the ASEAN Political,
Economic and Socio-Cultural Communities”).
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),69 and other
communities that seek to pursue economic integration while preserving
domestic sovereignty.70
Not every international economic arrangement practices subsidiarity;
it is not really a feature of the WTO, for instance, though that organization
tolerates regional arrangements.71  But the delegation down is a feature of
IFR that is shared by regional organizations pursuing integration cau-
tiously, but not without ambition.72  For such institutions, subsidiarity can
be a strategy of the formal legality possessed.
2. Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality has long been an interest of international lawyers,
even though it, like IFR, is largely an example of the practice of domestic
agencies and courts, rather than states.73  Interest in the subject grew
largely because in the wake of World War II, American agencies and courts
rather aggressively applied their own rules to foreign companies, while in
the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU did something similar, as Anu
Bradford has observed.74  To define the phenomenon is to understand that
its controversy lies in the ordinarily domestic focus of its practitioners.
Extraterritoriality is a particular obsession of United States regulators,
69. In ECOWAS, member states are charged with “establishing and strengthening
appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and
inter-State conflicts,” to the extent possible, with ECOWAS intervening through one of
its organizational arms when local cooperation breaks down. See Bjørn Møller, The Pros
and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organisations
in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa 31 (Danish Inst. for Int’l Studies Working Paper
No. 2005/4, 2005), available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/
18629/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/d2bffdb0-cb33-425e-be5c-
4a63a607a468/en/pros_and_cons_subsidiarity.pdf.
70. Even the UN has embraced the principle of subsidiarity, as evidenced by article
53.1 of its Charter, which provides “[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate,
utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its author-
ity” and goes on to say in article 52.2 that “[t]he Members of the United Nations . . .
shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security
Council.” Sorpong Peou, The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN
Context, 4 GLOBAL GOV. 439, 440 (2008), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf-
plus/27800211.pdf.
71. Understanding the WTO: The Organization - Whose WTO is it anyway?, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm
(Last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (“The WTO is ‘member-driven’, with decisions taken by
consensus among all member governments.”); Groups in the Negotiations, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_
e.htm (Last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (Listing member coalitions within the WTO).
72. See, supra, notes 56 and accompanying text.
73. See Tony Putnam, An $8.9 billion fine shows that foreign banks evade U.S. laws at
their peril, WASHINGTON POST, (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/30/an-8-9-billion-fine-shows-that-foreign-banks-evade-u-s-
laws-at-their-peril/.
74. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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and their critics.75  Justice Holmes in 1908 reminded his readers of “the
general and almost universal rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.”76  But everything changed for American courts and agen-
cies in 1945, when, the Second Circuit, sitting for the Supreme Court,
promulgated the famous— or infamous, depending on your point of view—
”effects test” holding that U.S. legislation or regulation would apply in any
case in which foreign conduct was intended to and did in point of fact
affect American commerce.77  Of late, courts and agencies have
approached extraterritoriality with more caution.78
Although associated with American regulatory arrogance, the extrater-
ritoriality of law is not an exclusively American phenomenon.  The Perma-
nent Court of International Justice declared in the Lotus Case that “the
territoriality of criminal law . . . is not an absolute principle of interna-
tional law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty.”79  And,
as Bradford has reminded us, Europe has become an important practi-
tioner of extraterritoriality, famously prohibiting a merger between two
American companies— GE and Honeywell— that American regulators had
approved in 1999, and playing an important role in sanctioning Microsoft
for tying new products through its monopoly in computer operating
systems.80
It is the work of antitrust regulators,81 and the plaintiffs’ securities
75. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovern-
mental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 12– 13 (2002)
(describing how “[i]n the New Deal and immediate postwar eras, domestic regulatory
law expanded markedly in the U.S. and across the globe”); Anne-Marie Slaughter &
David T. Zaring, Extraterritoriality in a Globalized World, available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=39380 (connecting the growth of extraterritoriality
with the rise of the regulatory state).  For a critique of the current practice, see Austen L.
Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673 (2013); see, e.g.,
Kal Raustiala, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL-
ITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009) (reviewing the history of extraterritoriality); Christina Duffy
Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 973 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s modern view of extraterritoriality);
Chimene I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 114 (2011) (discussing
the role of extraterritoriality in human rights).
76. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Corp., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). Holmes was
paraphrasing the holding in The Apollon, which provided that “the laws of no nations
can be justly extended beyond its own territory.”  22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
77. United States v. Aloca, 148 F.2d 416, 443– 44 (2d Cir. 1945).
78. While the United Sates is thought to be the foremost proponent of the extraterri-
torial application of its own economic laws, its Supreme Court has evinced some skepti-
cism about the practice. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2877– 78 (2010) (requiring a clear statement from Congress before applying American
laws with private rights of action extraterritorially); David Zaring, Finding Legal Princi-
ple in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683, 689 (2012) (noting the contro-
versy of extending U.S. financial regulation beyond its borders).
79. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
80. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 20– 21, 61 (2012).
81. The Supreme Court has broadly permitted the extraterritorial application of
American antitrust. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 820 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (opposing the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Con-
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class action bar, that animates this question of such interest to interna-
tional lawyers.82  These domestic institutions simply illustrate that a tradi-
tionally fertile area of international legal scholarship is not simply a matter
of the legal practice of states, as divorced from the regulatory predilections
of the agencies within those states.
3. Broadly Observed Human Rights
The relevance of domestic institutions to realizing global values
applies even to matters of international law that some would argue have
risen to the level of jus cogens,83 or something quite close to it.  Perhaps the
way to characterize them is as broadly observed rights, which may be
implemented by treaty, but are often posited to reach those countries not
party to the treaty.
Consider human rights.  The parties to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which includes rights to self-deter-
mination, to be treated “without discrimination of any kind as to race, col-
our, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status,” and to a panoply of other social
rights, has been signed and ratified by the vast majority of the countries in
the world.84
gress over antitrust defendants’ foreign activity on the ground that “this and other courts
have frequently recognized that . . . statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign
persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international
law”).  For a further discussion, see Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law As Part of
Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 57 (2004). See also Developments in the Law: Comity and
Extraterritoriality in Antitrust Enforcement, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1269, 1269– 70 (2011)
(“The . . .  extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has drawn intense legal and
political debate, culminating in its current status as a battleground in the fight over the
proper extent of U.S. extraterritoriality.”).
82. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877– 78 (2010) (requir-
ing a clear statement from Congress before applying American laws with private rights
of action extraterritorially).
83. Jus cogens is the Latin term for non-derogable principles of international law.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.Doc. A/CONF.39/27,
available at http://www.hostelworld.com/hosteldetails.php/Minka-Hostel/Quito/80305
?dateFrom=2014-12-28&dateTo=2014-12-30 (art. 53 defines “peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law (jus cogens)” as “a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character”). See also Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International
Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed
Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 823 (1990) (“there is much scholarly support for the
view that most international human rights norms constitute at least binding rules of
customary law if not, indeed, noderogable rules or jus cogens.”).  Though beyond that, it
is hard to know what, exactly, jus cogens includes.  As Jules Lobel observed, “Some
dispute exists over what norms are fundamental. The International Law Commission, in
adopting the notion of jus cogens in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, did
not elaborate on its content, in part because even the drafting commission could not
agree on what norms constituted jus cogens.” Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional
Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1148
(1985).
84. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (Dec. 16, 1966) available at http://www.un-docu-
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The states that have ratified the ICESCR Convention, however, have
committed only to enforcing the tenets of the convention through monitor-
ing via a body known as a committee on economic and cultural social
rights established by a so-called Economic and Social Council.85  The mon-
itoring mechanism does not provide for state against state, or individual
against state, complaints, and the council does not offer dispute resolution
services.  Instead, as part of the convention, the council provides opportu-
nities for states to show that they have taken steps in their domestic set-ups
to implement the commitments they have undertaken.86
Similarly, a state that ratifies the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which includes rights against discrimination, freedom
from torture and slavery, and the liberty and security of the person, is
monitored by the UN’s Human Rights Committee, rather than subjected to
judicial review.87  As the HRC has stated, “Where there are inconsistencies
between domestic law and the Covenant, article 2 requires that the domes-
tic law or practice be changed to meet the standards imposed by the Cove-
nant’s substantive guarantees.”88  But the committee is comprised of
nothing more than “independent experts,” and their chief task is dia-
logue.89 The committee monitors implementation by receiving reports and,
in light of the reports and the research of its members, measures the steps
ments.net/icescr.htm.  The United States has only signed, but not yet ratified, the
convention.
85. Shortcomings of the council and challenges to its effectiveness have been appar-
ent since its creation. For a general discussion of the obstacles confronted by the coun-
cil, see Phillip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332 (1987).  As Bar-
bara Stark has observed, “[a]s part of ICESCR compliance, ratifying nations prepare
self-monitoring reports that document their efforts, successes, and failures to “progres-
sively achieve” the goals set out in ICESCR. These “country reports” are reviewed by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “Committee”).” Barbara Stark,
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an
“Entirely New Strategy, “ 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 89 (1992).
86. For a description of the council’s current enforcement mechanism and sugges-
tions for improvement, see Audrey R. Chapman, A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 23
(1996); Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights: Should There Be An International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the
Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (2004).
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), INFORMATION PLAT-
FORM HUMAN RIGHTS.CH, http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/un-treaties/iccpr/
88. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, ¶13, U.N. Doc. . CCPR/C/
21/Rev. 1/Add 13 (May 26, 2004).
89. The membership of the committee is listed on the committee’s website. UN
Human Rights Committee –  Members, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2013). Its current American member, for example, is an international law
professor at Harvard Law School. See U.N. Secretary General, Election, in Accordance
with Articles 28 to 32 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of Nine
Members of the Human Rights Committee to Replace Those Whose Terms are Due to Expire
on 31 December 2010, 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/SP/75 (Sept. 2, 2010) available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/membersCVs/neuman.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (presenting the credentials of Professor Neuman to the 29th meeting of states
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
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states have taken to implement the government’s rights and commenting
on those reports.90  The committee then sends written comments to each
state regarding their implementation of the ICCPR.91
The point is a straightforward one.  Many of the mechanisms for the
protection of fundamental human rights value domestic implementation,
and make it (as scrutinized by monitors and critics) the mechanism used to
do the actual work of realizing international commitments,— a process that
students of IFR would find familiar— while leaving international oversight
to a rather flexible sort of peer review and monitoring.
4. Dualism
The experience of international financial regulation helps to under-
score how likely soft law is to be dualist, rather than monist.92  IFR is
entirely dualist, which raises the question as to whether traditional interna-
tional law can be so committed to its purportedly monist roots.
The dualism/monism distinction is one of the traditional bat-
tlegrounds of international law.93 The question is whether international
law is the governing domestic law of a country party to it, or whether inter-
national law only binds domestic actors like courts when duly enacted
through domestic legislation or some other domestically cognizable legal
90. As the HRC puts it on its website;
All States parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how
the rights are being implemented. States must report initially one year after
acceding to the Covenant and then whenever the Committee requests (usually
every four years). The Committee examines each report and addresses its con-
cerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of “concluding
observations.”
UN Human Rights Committee, Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx
91. See id.
92. Curt Bradley has explained the difference between monism and dualism as
follows:
Traditionally, the debate regarding the relationship between international law
and domestic law has been described as a debate between “monism” and “dual-
ism.” See generally J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International
Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 66 (1936) (describing this debate). In essence, the
monist view is that international law and domestic law are “component parts of
a ‘universal legal order’ in which international law has a certain supremacy.”
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (3d ed. 1999). Thus,
in its most extreme form, monism would require, among other things, that
domestic courts “give effect to international law, notwithstanding inconsistent
domestic law, even domestic law of constitutional character.” LOUIS HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (1995). The dualist view, by con-
trast, is that international law and domestic law are “two separate, mutually
independent legal orders that regulate quite different matters and have quite
different sources.” HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (2d ed.
1966). Under this view, international law is to be applied by domestic courts
only when it has been transformed into domestic law pursuant to the rules of
the domestic system. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separa-
tion of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J.
479, 537 n.102 (1998).
93. See HENKIN, supra note 96, at 64.
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act.94  A dualist view “assumes that international law and municipal law
are two separate legal systems which exist independently of each other.”95
Monists understand international law and domestic law as components of
a single legal institution, with international law occupying a position of
supremacy over the local variant.96
But in IFR, although international agreements provide the contents for
domestic regulation, thinking of their role as supreme misses the point.
The international arena is where policy is formulated.97  But it is the local
arena where legal obligation is maintained.98  The radically dualist nature
of IFR differs from some traditional accounts of public international law,
but it is consistent with the emerging American consensus as to how that
law works.
Consider the Free Zones case, thought to be a stalwart of the monist
vision, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice held that “it
is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope
of her international obligations.”99  IFR works the opposite way.  France
depends on its own legislation to give any force whatsoever to the scope of
its international obligations.
Similarly the rule found in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties providing that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justifications for its failure to perform a treaty” is subject to
a similar revision when the question is one of financial regulation.100
The powerful dualist tendency underscored by financial regulation
reaches into areas long claimed by monists, such as the implementation of
treaties.  America is a traditionally dualist system,101 but in recent years it
has particularly insisted on distinguishing between the ratification of an
international commitment and its relevance as a source of legal obligation
94. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864– 66 (1987) (discussing
monism and dualism); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347, 2348– 49  (1991) (categorizing transnational public law as some combi-
nation of the monist and dualist views of international law). J.G. Starke, Monism and
Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 66 (1936) (describing
and contrasting the arguments of each theory’s leading proponents).
95. MALANCZUK, supra note 48, at 63.
96. For a discussion of dualists and monists, see Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Mon-
ism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633 (2007).  Waters argues that “creeping monism describes a phe-
nomenon in which common law courts are abandoning their traditional dualist orienta-
tion and are beginning to utilize unincorporated human rights treaties in their work
despite the absence of legislation giving domestic legal effect to the treaties.” Id. at 633.
97. Viral Acharya & T Sabri O¨ncu¨, A better way to design global financial regulation,
VOX, http://www.voxeu.org/article/better-way-design-global-financial-regulation.
98. See id.
99. Free zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. V. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J.
(Series A/B) No. 46, at 167 (June 7).
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Per discussion, see MALANCZUK, supra note 48, at 64.
101. See HENKIN, supra note 92, at 71.
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in domestic governance.102
Under traditional international law, treaties do not bind states until
ratified by the relevant domestic actor, at which point they become fully
realized legal obligations.103  However, this broad language has been inter-
preted by American courts as not making American treaty commitments
actionable before the judiciary unless; in ratifying the treaty, there has
been a clear statement suggesting that the treaty is “self-executing.”104
Congress has found this doctrine to its liking as well. In recent years, the
Senate has frequently stipulated that the President could not consider a
treaty ratified until Congress has passed implementing legislation.105
This practice by Congress is aggressively dualist— but, of course, it
parallels the entirely dualist nature of IFR, which does not involve Con-
gress (or public international law).  The dualist nature of the IFR regime is
part and parcel of its reliance for legitimation from the domestic agencies
that are the members of the international policy-making networks.  And it
is consistent with the American view of how other forms of international
legal obligation work— but not really with the monist view of public inter-
national law.
This is not to say that monism does not exist, or is a sham, but it does
show how important dualism is to the broader picture of international gov-
ernance, and how it may perhaps be an underappreciated component in
public international law.
5. Conclusion
The reliance on domestic institutions in international governance is
reflective of the relatively disaggregated way that the state has been chang-
ing.106  Rather than one billiard ball of state-level interests, states contain
multitudes; looking inside the state is necessary for international law
102. US Citizens and International Law, AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD, https://american-
sabroad.org/issues/citizenship/us-citizens-and-international-law/.
103. Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2066 (2003) (“The history
of the law of treaties, greatly simplified, supports a shift in gravity from signature to
ratification.”).  The United States requires Senate ratification before any treaty can
become part of domestic law.  Other states have similar requirements; the United King-
dom requires an act of Parliament before a treaty can become domestic law. VALERIE
EPPS & LORIE GRAHAM, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, (3rd ed. 2009).
Moreover, the Constitution provides that “this constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made and pursuant thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”
U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
104. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008) (ruling that “[w]hile a treaty
may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Con-
gress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treat itself conveys an intention that it
be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on that basis.”) .
105. EPPS & GRAHAM, supra note 109, § 3.13.1.
106. For example, “[w]hen articulating domestic policies, mayors, governors, and
members of state and city legislatures often look beyond their own borders for guidance
and sometimes choose to affiliate their localities with transnational initiatives.” Judith
Resnik, Foreign As Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs
Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 34 (2007).
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scholars interested in IFR.107
In doing so, they are drawing on insights made by distinguished
observers of an earlier era.  Phillip Jessup, for example, defined “transna-
tional law” in 1956 as “all law which regulates actions or events that tran-
scend national frontiers” and including “[b]oth public and private
international law . . . [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such
standard categories” to deal with the type of sub-treaty regulation that
crosses borders, among other things.108
By the same token, applying to international law the legal process
approaches developed in domestic law in the 1950s produced articles and
casebooks that went beyond the state to consider, such as constituents
within states that pursued trade conflicts and decisions to abrogate sover-
eign contracts.109  By the 1970s, the legal focus shifted more to the private
side of international legal relationships, with a particular emphasis on the
role of multinational corporations.  Steiner and Vagts’ Transnational Legal
Problems casebook essentially invented the field of international business
transactions and has echoes in the below-the-state level coordination that
characterizes network analysis from the legal perspective.110  Since then
Slaughter’s network view has taken hold and has scholars appearing a little
in, but mostly out, of international financial regulation.111
This is not to suggest that international law in its classical variant is
the same thing as IFR, but rather that the IFR, in appearing somewhat simi-
lar to way international law really works, underscores the importance of
domestic institutions and making international commitments real commit-
ments on which domestic actors can less rely. It is a lesson that many legal
scholars have taken to heart.
107. E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J.  1,
191 (2003) (examining the participation of different courts in the international litiga-
tion process and the impact such a development has on international politics); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
283, 285 (2004) (describing a “new sovereignty” in which nations need to possess “the
capacity to participate in the international and transgovernmental regimes, networks,
and institutions that are now necessary to allow governments to accomplish through
cooperation with one another what they could once only hope to accomplish” under the
traditional Westphalian conception of sovereignty).
108. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (Yale University Press ed., 1956).
109. ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE, 249– 306, 805– 77 (Little
Brown & Co ed., 1967).
110. HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (Foundation
Press ed., 2nd ed. 1976).
111. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press ed.,
2004). See also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovern-
mental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (using
the examples of international securities, competition, and environmental law to argue
for an agency-level perspective on international law); David Zaring, Informal Procedure,
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) (discussing
the importance of informal international regulatory cooperation as exemplified in the
financial context). See also David Zaring, Network and Treaty Performance During the
Financial Crisis, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 63, 65 (2009) (discussing these works).
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II. Coordination
A. Coordination as a Legal Value
One of the points of legal systems is to permit parties to coordinate
their interests— contracts, for example, are premised on such interest con-
fluence— but coordination is often viewed derisively by some critics in
international law.112  These critics complain: why call it law if the parties
to the project would have done it anyway?113  The idea is that if an arrange-
ment can only exist if both parties benefit from it, then the arrangement
must be unstable, and will be negated if either party concludes that its
benefit is wanting.  Can such win-win (as long as both parties are winning)
arrangements really be called law?
The experience of IFR reminds that coordination games create compar-
ative winners and losers, just as do contract claims.114  IFR also depends
upon lawyers, and governs the practices of public agencies and private par-
ties.115  Moreover, its implementation creates consequences, good and less
good, for those who embrace it.  How should we think about the legality of
international law if it shares these consequences with IFR?
International law often comes in for a great deal of criticism based on
its coordinative function.116  Posner and Goldsmith have raised questions
about its customary variant in particular.117  They argue that “interna-
tional law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their inter-
ests. International law emerges from states pursuing their interests to
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, and it is sustained [only] to the
degree to which it continues to serve those interests.”118  Posner and
112. Moreover, aspects of international law are analogized to contracts. See Andrew
T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 585 (2005)
(noting that the “analogy to contracts is useful because it offers a good starting point for
the study of international agreements”).
113. See Andrew T. Gutzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1831– 32 (2002).
114. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 579, 585– 86 (2005).
115. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in the Global Financial Crisis, 24
AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 214, 218– 224 (2010); see also Stefano Pagliari, Who Governs Finance?
The Shifting Public-Private Divide in Regulation of Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge
Funds, 18 EUR. L. J. 44, 45 (2011).
116. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 171, 175 (2008) (describing, though not adopting, the realist approach to
international law).
117. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (“This theory rejects the usual explanations of CIL based on
opinio juris, legality, morality, and related concepts. States do not comply with norms of
CIL because of a sense of moral or legal obligation; rather, their compliance and the
norms themselves emerge from the states’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the inter-
national stage”).
118. Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463, 467 (2006). This view about international law come from a
social scientific view of state interest focused on the rational actor. As Goldsmith and
Posner have argued, “international law emerges from and is sustained by nations acting
rationally to maximize their interests (i.e., their preferences over international relations
outcomes), given their perception of the interests of other states, and the distribution of
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Vermeule have also questioned its importance when international
problems grow very severe, as they do in times of war or crisis.119
The Goldsmith and Posner view builds on a rich tradition of political
science skepticism about the merits of international law.120  A primary
school in international relations— the rational choice realists— have always
suspected that international law is nothing more than a meaningless exer-
cise in labeling by hopeful academics and other hangers-on, a position
articulated by Hans Morganthau in the post-war period,121 and many
others since.122  International relations realism, along with its legal sympa-
thizers, treats states as self-interested unitary actors of varying strengths
locked in an anarchic struggle to survive, and unconstrained by legal prin-
ciple when it conflicts with self-interest.123
But from the perspective of IFR, the anarchic struggle is not so obvi-
ous— not, at least, after four decades of effort to create international institu-
tions capable of regulating world finance.  In light of this experience,
branding coordination enterprises as somehow unrelated to the project of
international law— or international relations— seems bizarre.124  IFR, after
state power.” Id. at 463. Rather than hewing to international legal obligations because
they are law, “self-interest and the logic of the strategic situation do a much better job of
explaining the behaviors associated with international law.” Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 134
(2003).
119. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADIS-
ONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).
120. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 n.2 (1999) (“Our approach has many affinities with
the rational choice school in international relations.”)
121. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 3– 15 (1960) (describing the tenets of realism). Morgenthau’s work built on
earlier skepticism by E. H. Carr. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE 20-YEAR CRISIS, 1919
THROUGH 1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1940).
122. See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88 (1979) (stating
that “[i]nternational systems are decentralized and anarchic”); see also ADAMSON HOEBEL,
THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1967) (likening international law to systems like Eskimo
law, with weak enforcement, self-help, and a lack of delegation to officials with
authority).
123. Many realists argue that international institutions have no effect on the impor-
tant aspects of international life— namely, the competition between states. See John J.
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 7
(1994) (assessing three major international relations theories that assert the value of
institutions— liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory— and noting
their logical flaws and inconsistencies with the historical record); John J. Mearsheimer, A
Realist Reply, 20 INT’L SECURITY 75, 82 (1995) (“Realists . . . believe that institutions
cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers . . . Institutional
outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not
have significant independent effects on state behavior.”).
124. And not just from an IFR perspective, it is perhaps worth noting. See, e.g., Rob-
ert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from
Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (2008) (“In many cases - and perhaps most - an
essential expectation behind the externally directed coordination function of foreign
affairs and international law is the coordination of rules and standards”); Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
211, 242 (2004) (“we can imagine at least two ways in which international law can
enhance international peace and security: by directly reducing enforcement and compli-
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all, is regulation, interpreted by lawyers, and devised by bureaucrats, via an
increasingly legalized process.  It looks a lot like law.
But at the same time, it emphasizes coordination. The rules must be
agreed upon, rather than imposed.  IFR operates through consensus, and
its coercion mechanisms are modest and horizontal (as I discussed earlier,
IFR relies upon peer review to police compliance by regulators with their
international commitments).125
But coordination has long made for law that anyone would recognize
as “real.”  And coordination has to occur at some equilibrium; that equilib-
rium may favor one interested party over others.  The process of IFR is not
only replete with winners and losers, but with compliance as well.  One
cannot ignore all cases where legal or regulatory instruments were
deployed in the service of coordination and cooperation.  Indeed, a large
part of international law may be conceived of as law made in the service of
enlarging pies, which might still be considered important and legal.
B. The Global Transformation of Accounting
Consider, as an example familiar to IFR, the sea change in the way that
corporations report their results across the world— the global transforma-
tion of accounting standards.126  At some point in the not too distant
future, the SEC will implement a new set of accounting standards: one
devised in Europe, by European accountants and securities regulations, to
European specifications, and consistent with European preferences.127  In
doing so, it will repeal, amend, or ignore its formerly preferred standards:
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which will wither
ance costs, and by facilitating coordination to promote transnational norms that would
tend to enhance security.”); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1857 (2002) (discussing the role of international law
in enhancing coordination, and observing that “[i]f one adopts a more realistic model of
a coordination game, however, international law can play a significant role”).
125. See supra notes 60– 55 and accompanying text. R
126. See William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting
Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 471– 72 (2010) (“International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) swept the globe even as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) retained their hold over companies and securities markets in the United
States.”); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Real-
istic Appraisal of a Qllixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“This Article probes the
most revolutionary development in securities regulation since the New Deal: the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission’s willingness to jettison rules requiring companies to
apply recognized US accounting standards by inviting use of a new set of international
ones created by a private London-based organization.”).
127. For more discussion, see Bratton, supra note 132, at 474 (“Ironically, a switch
to IFRS would also allow management to reclaim some of the lost territory while simul-
taneously enhancing rents collected by its auditors.”); Cunningham, supra note 132, at 3
(noting the revolutionary nature of “the Securities and Exchange Commission’s willing-
ness to jettison rules requiring companies to apply recognized U.S. accounting stan-
dards by inviting use of a new set of international standards created by a private
London-based organization”).  For a history of the International Accounting Standards
Board, told from the perspective of a former SEC commissioner, see Roberta S. Karmel
& Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
883, 901 (2009).
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into desuetude.  American regulators have grudgingly agreed to accept the
standards soon.128
This international process will have affected the way that every public
company in the world reports its results, and in doing so will have achieved
an equilibrium that will force American regulators and companies to
change their ways— it is, in short, a coordination game that American inter-
est has played only grudgingly, and ultimately with little impact on the
final product.  But, of course, it will be worth it to have a set of accounting
standards that work for all companies, be they based in Stockholm, Shang-
hai, or Schenectady.129  In this sense, accounting harmonization is a coor-
dination game which benefitted everyone, but Europe in particular; Europe
not only reaped the windfall of standard accounting, but also chose the
standard itself.
The history of accounting standards coordination is an interesting
one, filled with stops, starts, and conflict.  In the 1980s, capital market
regulators tentatively agreed to support an effort by professional account-
ing organizations to try for global harmonization of accounting rules.130
The effort proved controversial, as American regulators comfortable with
the unique American approach to financial statements withdrew their sup-
port for the enterprise in the early 1990s.131
128. The proposed rule may be found on the SEC website. See SEC, http://www.sec
.gov/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issu-
ers, 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 229, 230, 240, 244, 249 (proposed Nov. 14, 2008) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8982.pdf. The decision is not without
controversy, however, and it is premature to declare that the commitment to IFRS by
2014 is absolute (though eventual commitment is probably inevitable).  For a critique
see Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 805– 06
(2009) (“The SEC engaged in a multi-year project in which it repeatedly promised to
allow U.S. companies to use IFRS instead of GAAP. The market crisis likely delayed this
move, but more important, it called into question the justifications for the move. IFRS
offers issuers greater discretion with respect to financial REporting, thus reducing finan-
cial statement transparency.”).
129. For a discussion of the evolution of this process, see James D. Cox, Coping in A
Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for A 75-Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 944
(2009) (“in fall 2008 the SEC placed the death of GAAP, at least for securities disclo-
sures, on the agenda by proposing that ultimately all U.S. issuers must comply with
IFRS. Increasingly, the SEC’s regulatory posture on financial reporting issues is one of
accommodation to foreign issuers rather than its historical position of demanding obei-
sance to the U.S. way.”); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric
of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1486– 91 (2007) (focusing on the SEC’s willingness to adopt the
international standards). See also David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in Interna-
tional Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 611 (2008) (examining the “three character-
istic ways that international regulators make rules”).
130. See International Convergence of Accounting Standards— A Brief History, Financial
Accounting Standards Board, available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/Sec-
tionPage&cid=1176156304264#The_1970s_and_1980s (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Convergence of Accounting Standards]
131. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principle-
Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV.
1411, 1486 (2007) (“Some form of competition has existed for years between the SEC/
FASB and the IFRS promulgators. The SEC historically provided international leadership
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That exit, however, did not stop the process of devising common
accounting standards.132  Instead, the international efforts moved to
Europe; the creation of international accounting standards after the SEC’s
rejection has been managed by the International Accounting Standards
Board, a London-based public-private arrangement created in 2001.133
IASB has devised a set of accounting standards, the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), which have enjoyed quick adoption in Euro-
pean and other countries.134  IFRS was essentially created without Ameri-
can participation.135  It has, in the course of the last decade, become the
favored accounting system in almost every relevant country in the world,
save one.136  IFRS growth, as Stavros Gadinis has shown, has hypertro-
phied in the past two decades. It is, at least nominally, the world’s new
accounting system.137
And therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, IFRS is rather different from
American accounting rules.  It is a principle-based, rather than rule-based
accounting system, in that it is less technical than traditional American
accounting.  IFRS relies more on the holism concept of gestalt, applying
this principle to assess the accuracy of a company’s returns.138  Account-
ing firms have developed treatises on the differences between IFRS and
GAAP;139 among other things, IFRS takes a different view about when
on accounting matters, filling the lacuna that exists in the international arena, which
lacks a centralized power . . . In accounting, the SEC and FASB use diplomacy to influ-
ence promulgators of alternative accounting systems in a process in which the SEC both
exerts political pressure and succumbs to it.”).
132. Cf. Convergence of Accounting Standards, supra note 136.
133. For an overview, see About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS FOUNDATION,
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013)
(describing the history of the IASB).
134. See Who We Are and What We Do, IFRS FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, available at http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Documents/Who
WeAre_JAN-2014_ENG.pdf (last revised Sept. 2014).
135. As Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman have observed, “uniform accounting
standards are rapidly crystallizing out of the babble of national rules and practices into
two well-defined sets of international standards: the GAAP accounting rules adminis-
tered by the Financial Auditing Standards Board in the U.S. and the International
Accounting Standards administered by the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee in London.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 457 (2001).
136. Closing the GAAP, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/
node/21559350/.
137. Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International
Financial Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L. J. 157 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2214709.
138. For an overview, albeit a skeptical one, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescrip-
tion to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regu-
lation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1486– 91 (2007).
139. Compare IFRS and US GAAP: A Pocket Comparison, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Ltd. (July 2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/
Local%20Assets/Documents/us_assurance_IFRS_US_comparison2008.pdf, and IFRS
and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (October
2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/issues/ifrs-reporting/publications/
assets/ifrs-and-us-gaap-similarities-and-differences-2014.pdf, with IFRS Compared to US
GAAP: An Overview, KPMG LLP (November 2013), available at http://www.kpmg.com/
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assets must be “marked to market” (an important question for banks and
other institutions that have the capacity of holding those assets for long
terms).140
As foreign jurisdictions have gained more and more of the business of
floating stocks and bonds and raising capital, American capital market reg-
ulators have given up hoping that they might do so in ways consistent with
the complicated GAAP.141  The capitulation to GAAP is still ongoing, but
from the multidecade perspective of states, it has been rapid.142  The SEC
has permitted foreign companies that list on American stock markets to
use IFRS to file their American annual and quarterly reports.143 The
agency, along with the CFTC, also intends to make IFRS an option for any
company that chooses to use it by 2014.144  Before long, the SEC will per-
mit its publicly traded companies to report their results through IFRS;145
the only question is when, and how much, the agency and American
accountants will be able to affect the end result of IFRS.  As such, American
companies will find that the accounting returns that they are legally
required to provide will have changed into something American regulators
and accountants did not choose.  The result— a global system of account-
ing— will be cheered by American financial officers, but it will not have
been done on American terms.
If this sea change in the way American businesses do business cannot
be described as law, then it is difficult to know what law, precisely, is.  Yet
CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/IFRS-compared-to-US-
GAAP-An-overview-O-201311.pdf, and US GAAP versus IFRS: The Basics, Ernst & Young
LLP (November 2013), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsAL/IFR-
SBasics_BB2435_November2012/$FILE/IFRSBasics_BB2435_November2012.pdf (com-
paring the large number of differences between IFRS and GAAP).
140. Another significant difference between IFRS and GAAP includes the recognition
of contingent revenue, which, under GAAP, normally does not occur until the contin-
gency is resolved; IFRS, in contrast, looks to the probability of the transaction occurring
and the ability to measure the contingent revenue.  Furthermore, the systems also
diverge in their method of revenue accounting for service transactions.  The IFRS
requires the use of percentage-of-completion method, whereas GAAP specifically prohib-
its such accounting in most cases. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, supra note 139, at 20.
141. For a discussion, see William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment
Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989 (2009)
(“the globalization wave continues to rise and GAAP’s days appear to be numbered”).
142. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, supra note 139, at 37– 38.
143. The SEC has made its views known on the question. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: AN ANALY-
SIS OF IFRS IN PRACTICE, SEC 3, 58  (2011), available at  http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-paper-111611-practice.pdf.
144. Id. For SEC statements on the agency’s cautious embrace of IFRS, see SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S.
ISSUERS: EXPLORING POSSIBLE METHOD OF INCORPORATION (2011) available at http://www
.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-paper-052611.pdf.
145. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting Standards to
Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily (Aug. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-184.htm).
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it has been created by IFR, a system that depends upon the coordination of
interests, rather than upon the legal commitment of a treaty.
C. Conclusion
Accounting is technical, and acronyms like GAAP v. IFRS daunt
almost as much as they reveal what, exactly, to what the distinction
amounts between rules-based and principles-based accounting.  But the
import of the triumph of IFRS can be gleaned by abstracting away from it,
and from the details of accounting.  The commitment to an international
effort in accounting has worked a sea change in the way that companies
report their results, and the sea change has come without much American
involvement— even though it will, in the near future, affect American com-
panies as much as anyone else.
It is, in short, a win-win coordination game that has benefited some
more than others.  Looking at international law through an IFR lens
prompts the observer to consider just how much international law— often
shorthanded as a mechanism for states to contract with one another, after
all— is comprised of this sort of coordination.  International law has been
quite a successful mechanism for resolving some of the cross-border exter-
nalities created by a globalizing world, with its problems of environmental
degradation, economic contamination, and trade and investment.  Here,
international law, and indeed often international soft law— taking on many
international legal characteristics— coordinates outcomes among states
that simply must be resolved through a variety of institutional arrange-
ments.  In environmental law, it has often been a treaty; the same goes for
international trade. For IFR, networks and soft legal institutions have been
the recourse.
In each of these cases, it is impossible to imagine the existence of an
international police force, or indeed that many countries would care
enough about the issues presented to mobilize their own soldiers to compel
their counterparties to obey. Yet it is in these areas where international law
has created a welter of regimes that affect what we do.  While almost none
of these regimes has the power to impose losses on participants, it is none-
theless the case that coordination creates some winners who win more
than others, as IFR exemplifies.
III. Contestation
Can a legal system claim to be a system if its rules cannot be reduced
to writing?  International lawyers have traditionally appeared to worry that
the answer is no.146 The search for rules that are reducible to writing is one
of the features of classic international legal scholarship, which has made
rulewriting one of its highest aspirations.147  Countless articles identify
146. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (Richard A
Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed., 1999).
147. Hence, the various Restatements of international law and the work of the Inter-
national Law Commission.  For a discussion of the ILC, see Jill McC. Watson, The Inter-
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new international norms.148  Puissant scholars in particular might be gar-
landed with appointment to the International Law Commission, where
they would be charged with writing international law, at least in draft
form, for states to consider adopting.149  And Article 38(2) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice gives scholarly writings the same status—
as secondary sources of international law— as judicial opinions.150
But perhaps international law, and less formal versions of interna-
tional governance, express principles, but do so through an iterated pro-
cess of principle revisitation.  Rather than fixing rules in stone, IFR
changes its baselines all the time.151  The question is whether more formal
variants of public international law are so different.
A. Ever Evolving International Governance
The traditional vision of the scholarly role in international law exposi-
tion is one that posits international law as reducible to rules, if one thinks
it through carefully enough— a vision that may stem from the work of the
natural law aficionados that founded the discipline.152  In the 17th cen-
tury, Hugo Grotius argued that the fundamental tenets of international law
could be derived from principles of justice that had a validity transcending
time and context and that could be discovered through reason.153  Grotius
believed that natural law, and thus the international law which depends
upon it, “would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that
which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no
God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him.”154
The search for the rules of international law has accordingly been an
abiding passion for legal theorists.155  But it also threatens to set overly
precise standards for a discipline that, on account of its horizontal struc-
ture, is likely to arrive at those sorts of standards very slowly, and only
national Law Commission: 1949-1998, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (2001) (book review) (“The
International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations was established more than
fifty years ago with the goal of continuing the effort, begun in the nineteenth century, to
develop and codify international law.”).  George Walker believes that the latest Restate-
ment of International Law “has renewed discussions of how to ascertain international
law.” George K. Walker, Sources of International Law and the Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3 (1988).
148. Jiangming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK. J.
INT’L L. 287, 289 (1999).
149. Michael Owen, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relation-
ship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 859 (2002) (“state responsibility
is the last significant area of the great effort to codify international law.”)
150. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 para 2.
151. David Zaring, Post-Crisis International Financial Regulation, available at http://
murphy.tulane.edu/files/events/ZARING_the_change_in_international_finance.pdf).
152. See Shen, supra note 148, at 291– 92.
153. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres: Prolegomena [The Law of War
and Peace: Prolegomena] ¶11 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925);
for a discussion, see William P. George, Grotius, Theology, and International Law: Over-
coming Textbook Bias, 14 J. L. & RELIGION 605, 606– 07 (2000).
154. GROTIUS, supra note 153, at ¶11.
155. Shen, supra note 148 at 289.
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after much disagreement, tentative agreement, and revisitation of the issue.
As Peter Malanczuk has observed of international law: “The horizontal sys-
tem of law operates in a different manner from a centralized one and is
based on principles of reciprocity and consensus rather than on command,
obedience, and enforcement.”156
This is not a surprise to observers of IFR.  The horizontal nature of
international financial regulation means that it resembles an argument
more than it does a list of rules, and reflection on the way it works suggests
that the desire to fix international law principles on ratified paper should,
perhaps, be tempered.  After all, neither IFR nor public international law
offers a monopoly on violence (which makes them different from a conven-
tionally Weberian definition of a legal system).157  And, like IFR, public
international law features ambitious claims about what the law requires,
and plenty of pushback against those ambitious claims by skeptics of legal
evolution— regardless of what legal scholars and the ILC identify as
evolving.158
International financial regulators frequently appear to agree about
very little.159  They meet and argue about the sorts of rules that they would
like to impose across the world’s financial markets.160  The debates can be
heated.161  Agreement is difficult.  And when there is resolution on
issues— when, say, a capital adequacy rule meets with consensus by the
world’s banking regulators— the issue must be revisited when the facts
require, as they often do.162  For example, the capital adequacy accord
promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision— the signa-
ture achievement of IFR— has gone through three complete revampings, as
well as other intermediate clarifications and reconceptualizations that are
156. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
(7th ed. 1997).
157. Max Weber explains that the government “upholds the claim to the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”  1 MAX WEBER, ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY 54 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). For a discussion, see
Benedict Sheehy & Jackson N. Maogoto, The Private Military Company-Unraveling the
Theoretical, Legal & Regulatory Mosaic, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 164 (2008) (“It
is the State’s monopoly of violence that underpins the international legal system and
justifies the emphasis on State sovereignty”).
158. For example, Curt Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have identified one such dispute
over the transformation of human rights norms into customary international law.  Cur-
tis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 818, 839 (1997) (compar-
ing Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights
Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 12– 21 (1996), with Bruno Simma & Philip Alston,
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL.
Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 83 (1992)).
159. See Jonathan Gage & Alan Friedman, U.S. and G-7 Allies Disagree About Regula-
tion Measures: Global Financial Reform: A Clash of Perceptions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1999),
http://nytimes.com/1999/01/30/news/30iht-davos.t.html.
160. See id.
161. As Singer observed, the United States and Britain nearly abandoned the process
of devising the first capital adequacy accord. See Singer, supra note 10, at 36– 67.
162. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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almost too numerous to mention.163  Students of IFR do not think that the
accord is unimportant even though it is constantly revisited— indeed, IFR is
structured to make that sort of revisitation constant.164
In international financial supervision, we have seen at the beginning
only limited work, like efforts by regulators to stay in touch with one
another, and to divide responsibilities over multijurisdictional financial
enterprises.165  That was then paired with efforts to cooperate across bor-
ders— but only to assist financial regulators in carrying out their domestic
responsibilities.166  Later still came deeper and more far-reaching efforts to
do things in the same way and with the same approach.167  This evolving
sort of cooperation was first done through core principles of financial insti-
tutional supervision (these “Principles” are quite short, broadly defined
guidelines that every regulator is meant to apply to its own organization
and to the regulated industry within its purview; they come in numbers of
21,168 28,169 or occasionally as many as 40,170 and are one of the first acts
of every financial regulatory network).
In some cases, the supervision has become even more elaborately
cooperative, and has resulted in the creation of complex rule systems that
163. Basel Regulatory Framework, Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve
.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
164. The Basel Committee’s Work, BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www
.bis.org/bcbs/bcbs_work.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
165. The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global
Marketplace, GROUP OF THIRTY, 12– 13, 16 (2008), available at http://www.group30.org/
images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervision.pdf.
166. See, e.g., IOSCO’s Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Int’l Org. of Sec.
Commissions, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (May 2002), http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf (rev. May 2012).
167. See Int’l Ass’n of Deposit Insurers, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance
Systems (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.iadi.org/docs/Core_Principles_final_29_Feb_08
.pdf; Int’l Ass’n of Ins. Supervisors, Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (Oct.
2003), http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology
.pdf; see FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing
of Terrorism & Proliferation - The FATF Recommendations (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www
.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations
.pdf
168. The International Association of Deposit Insurers, with the assistance of the
Basel Committee, came up with 21 core principles of effective deposit insurance admin-
istration. See Int’l Ass’n of Deposit Insurers, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance
Systems (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.iadi.org/docs/Core_Principles_final_29_Feb_08
.pdf for the complete list.
169. IAIS developed its set of 28 core principles of insurance supervision in 2003.
Int’l Ass’n of Ins. Supervisors, Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (Oct. 2003),
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology.pdf.
170. The FATF has 40 standards designed to combat money laundering, to which it
has added nine designed to stymie terrorism financing.  For the complete list of stan-
dards, see International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation –  the FATF Recommendations, THE FATF (Feb. 16, 2012) http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/internationalstandardson
combatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-thefatfrecommen
dations.html.
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leave little room for domestic discretion.171
The Basel III Capital Accord is an example of this kind of international
regulation, as are the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
that are being adopted by most securities regulators and promulgated by
the International Accounting Standards Board with assistance and govern-
ment input from the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO).172
Of course, progress in IFR, like in its domestic counterpart and in
many other international problems, is periodic, sporadic, and prompted by
crisis. The Basel Committee was founded after a banking crisis in 1974.173
Its most recent iteration of capital adequacy rules, the so-called Basel III,
was prompted by the latest global financial crisis that emanated from the
collapse in American housing prices.174  Throughout this period, innova-
tion in finance has created brand new markets— derivatives trading has
only become a big business in the last twenty years— and is getting, if any-
thing, even more global.175  Regulators have struggled to keep pace, and
doing so has required them to constantly move the targets and goalposts of
their missions.176
Other international lawyers might benefit from thinking about their
own bailiwicks through a paradigm of revisitation, rather than one that
looks for a Restatement-like fixity of rules.  International law fosters a
debate about bedrock commitments more often than it might appear.  It
might be useful to think of public international law, like IFR, as that which
resolves questions over obligation through contestation rather than
through mandate.
Thinking of public international law in this way insulates it from the
persistent criticism that it is often breached, without consequence to the
breaching party.  This critique is surely true; even if states observe most of
their treaty obligations most of the time,177 in any particular time and,
indeed, in particularly important times, powerful states may break their
legal obligations in the interests of their national security or other national
priorities.  Well-known American examples of this phenomenon include
the recent airstrikes in Libya, one pursuant to an aggressive interpretation
of a United Nations Security Council resolution,178 and the response to the
171. See Narissa Lyngen, Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 519, 519– 20 (2012).
172. For more on the IFRS, see supra notes 143– 144 and accompanying text.
173. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A brief history of the Basel Committee
(Oct. 2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
174. See id.
175. As former CFTC chair Brooksley Born observed, “[d]uring the past decade, the
world derivatives markets have grown exponentially in size and importance.” Brooksley
Born, International Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 607, 608 (2001).
176. See generally id.
177. As Louis Henkin has memorably observed, “[m]ost nations observe most inter-
national law most of the time.” LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2nd ed. 1979).
178. The coalition bombing of Libya has elicited conflicting responses. For a discus-
sion of the different positions, see Robert Booth, Libya: Coalition Bombing May Be in
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International Court of Justice’s decision in the Nicaragua Harbors case.179
Indeed, Jonathan Charney has argued that customary international law, if
it ever changes, must go through periods of noncompliance where states
break rules and adopt new ones in an effort to encourage their peers to do
the same.180
While some argue that occasional noncompliance by the powerful
means that international law is not very relevant to the interactions of
states,181 others recognize that all those lawyers deployed and all the time
spent on legal instruments must amount to something.182  Thinking of
international law in this way— as a way of debating values without expect-
ing uniform compliance with these values— explains some of the potential
of international law a bit more persuasively, and it also illuminates some of
the tensions behind something that occasionally looks like a pitfall of inter-
Breach of UN Resolution’s Legal Limits, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/28/libya-bombing-un-resolution-law. See also Curtis Doeb-
bler, The Use of Force Against Libya: Another Illegal Use of Force, JURIST (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-use-of-
force.php (concluding that “an application of international law to the facts indicates that
in fact the use of force is illegal”). The Libya intervention was not clearly authorized by
Congress. See Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22powers
.html?_r=1&.
179. See Katrina J. Church, The Briar Patch of Reality: A Legal Analysis of the Mining of
Nicaragua’s Harbors, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 169 (1985– 1986) (discussing the legal-
ity of American action in Nicaragua). For facts of the case and details of the proceedings,
see Paul S. Reichler, Holding America to Its Own Best Standards: Abe Chayes and Nicaragua
in the World Court, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 15 (2001).
180. Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Gov-
ernment to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 916 (1986) (“to
change customary international law, a nation often must violate it”).
181. This argument is perhaps most often associated with Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
225 (2005) (“International law is a real phenomenon, but international scholars exag-
gerate its power and significance”).  And it has plenty of real world examples.  The Amer-
ican use of force in Kosovo, for example, probably breached formal international law.
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1
(1999).  Many have made similar arguments about the American invasion of Iraq. See,
e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004)
(positing that “the legal theory actually deployed by the United States is not persua-
sive”). As Harlan Cohen has observed, “for some, the patterns of noncompliance are
proof that international law is ‘law’ in name only.” Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding Interna-
tional Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 67 (2007).  And the
force of the argument is such that, as Jacob Katz Cogan has observed, “the rule-of-law
sentiment is so strong today that, for many scholars, the most important issue con-
fronting international law is how to induce compliance with international norms, that
is, how to encourage nations to obey international law.”  Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompli-
ance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 191 (2006) (citing ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS (1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
(review essay)).
182. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated The-
ory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005)
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national legal scholarship: where thoughtful academics announce the dis-
covery of new favored rights, such as rights to be free of war,183 to be free
of want,184 or to access healthcare.185  It is better to think of this work as
an effort to start a debate, rather than deriving a proof.
The point is not meant to be an overly constructivist one.  Construc-
tivists argue that legal meaning is created through communities of like-
minded thought, rather than from any logical necessity; it is a sociological,
arguably “soft” form of obligation that turns more on thought process than
on external requirement.186  But this Article is not a constructivist enter-
prise; it recognizes that legal obligation, when it crosses borders, is not
always relative, and not always supported by nothing more than a bit of we-
feeling among elites.187  But recognizing the negotiated nature of a govern-
183. See, e.g., David A. Soley, Hunt v. Galtieri: A Hypothetical Scenario for Holding
International Aggressors Civilly Liable in American Courts, 33 EMORY L.J. 211, 224 (1984)
(“The universality and clarity of this newly delineated international law eliminates much
of the ambiguity behind which aggressive nations once hid.”).
184. See Aravind R. Ganesh, The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1190
(2010) (arguing that “excessive buyer power” creates “harms suffered by farmers are
serious enough as to constitute violations of the international human right to food”).
185. See Puneet K. Sandhu, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States
Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1159
(2007) (“An American, certainly, would find it absurd to demand the government pro-
vide access to health care based on rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.”).
186. I associate the constructivist element of political science mostly with a strand of
international relations heterodoxy, see, e.g., JAMES FEARON & ALEXANDER WENDT, RATION-
ALISM V. CONSTRUCTIVISM: A SKEPTICAL VIEW, IN HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
52 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2004). It has found its
way into the international legal literature as well, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How
To Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621
(2004).  For a discussion, see David Zaring, Regulating by Repute, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1003, 1018 (2012).  I have elsewhere observed that “difficult-to-enforce international
norms have always required an internationalization of those norms by domestic admin-
istrative agencies charged with giving teeth to these agreements and accords of interna-
tional regulators. And that in turn probably requires some confidence in the
effectiveness and wisdom of the international legal institution.” David Zaring, Interna-
tional Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 503 (2010).
187. Political scientists have long considered how international relationships can be
formed through “epistemic communities” rooted in common understandings of
problems. For an introduction to the literature, see Knowledge, Power, and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (Winter 1992), a special issue of the journal Interna-
tional Organization that was devoted to epistemic communities. An in-depth discussion
of epistemic communities is beyond the scope of this Article, though it is worth noting
that there are some similarities between IFROs and these communities. The technical
nature of the work, the regularity of the meetings, and the neutral forum at which those
meetings are held contribute to an atmosphere where bureaucrats can obtain transna-
tional loyalties. As Tony Porter has concluded, such bureaucratic loyalty, as opposed to
national loyalty, can be found in the Basel Committee. See TONY PORTER, STATES, MAR-
KETS, AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 81 (1993) (describing the evolution of interna-
tional financial regulation from a political science perspective, with particular attention
to the Basel Committee); see also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J.
281, 330 (1998) (noting the possibility of developing and using international adminis-
trative law and procedure to oversee rulemaking by transnational regulatory
organizations).
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ance regime is not meant to deny that there is legal obligation present in
the international system.
B. Contestation in Finance and Crime
One useful way of looking at what various parts of international law
are supposed to do is to think about the fundamental question that those
components are meant to answer.  For IFR, the institution builders and rule
makers are asking, “What does a safe and sound global financial system
require?”  Answering that question has been a negotiated process.  It is not
one which reaches a terminal result but one that evolves over time— which
is why the international financial system is replete with the re-evaluation of
standards.
The Financial Stability Board, for example, uses peer review to check
on the commitment of its members and counterparties to the coordinated
outcomes meant to be created through financial regulatory cooperation.188
Peer review exemplifies the negotiated nature of IFR because, like all other
sorts of peer review, it inquires into, rather than demands allegiance to, the
values of the system.189
In this way, there has never been a time where the question “what does
a safe and sound global financial system require?” has been clearly and
unanimously answered.  And of course, throughout all of these evolutions
in the style and degree of international governance made, regulators have
pursued their own interests and the interests of the industries they over-
see— indeed, many political scientists, such as David Singer and Abraham
Newman, have identified this sort of state influence as being a critical com-
ponent in explaining the content of the rules of IFR.190
188. The Board is, in conjunction with the IMF, dedicating a substantial portion of its
resources to “peer review,” designed to see that its member countries are making pro-
gress towards implementing the programs that it has pursued internationally.  These
peer reviews feature self-reporting by the regulators to other members of the FSB, and
are paired with, and modeled off of, the IMF’s own Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram.  Jeffery Atik, Basel II: A Post-Crisis Post-Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 731, 758 (2011) (describing the IMF program).  The IMF describes the purpose
of the program as “a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s financial sector.
See The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2014).
189. For a discussion of peer review, see J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of
Regulatory Peer Review, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10553, 10554 (2008) (“Like
scientific peer review, the review and critique would be conducted prior to the agency’s
final decision by qualified, independent experts who have no pecuniary or other conflict
of interest in the outcome of the agency’s decision.”).  For criticism of the peer review
process, at least as applied to the world of international trade law, see LARS NOAH,
“Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY
L.J. 1033, 1064– 65 (2000).
190. See David Bach & Abraham Newman, Transgovernmental Cooperation and
Domestic Policy Convergence: Power, Information, and the Global Quest Against Insider
Trading, 36 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450395 (concluding that
“[l]ead regulators are able to use their relationships to promote policy export and shape
foreign legislative agendas . . . underscore[ing] the crucial, yet theoretically and empiri-
cally neglected role that power plays within transgovernmental relations.”); see Singer,
supra note 10 (arguing that Basel in particular was a product of agitation from American
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In sum, instead of iron rules, fixed and permanent, representing pla-
tonic ideals of sound international governance that might be fixed in print
by legal scholars, financial regulation is a messy debate.  But in this way it
really may not be different than other kinds of more formal international
laws.
One could look at perhaps the most active area of public international
law over the last 20 years— international criminal law— and analyze it quite
similarly.  It too, has an animating question— what activities by states and
individuals should be regarded as international crimes?— the answer to
which is a subject of debate, even after the Rome Statute criminalized terms
like “atrocities” and “aggression” and attempted to define them.191  But
even after the treaty’s conclusion, there is a great deal of negotiation about
what should be beyond the pale and what should be regretfully tolerated as
hardly unprecedented state and leader conduct.192
Consider the crime of aggression.  First mentioned in the London
Charter governing the Nuremburg trials, aggression was included in a laun-
dry list of “crimes against peace;” ever since, it has been difficult to discern
where the outer bounds of such a crime lie.193  The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly adopted a resolution on the definition of aggression, one
that included both a general definition and a list of examples of aggression
crimes, in 1974.194  The general definition provided that “Aggression is the
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations.”195 The specifics include
and British banks worried about competition from Japanese banks that, it was felt, oper-
ated under significantly less onerous regulatory requirements, especially requirements
related to the amount of capital reserves required).
191. For one account of the effort to define the term “atrocity,” see William A.
Schabas, Retroactive Application of the Genocide Convention, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 36, 41– 42 (2010).
192. As Muneer Ahmed has argued, the debate is “epitomized by the ever-shifting
nature of such seemingly bedrock questions as who is an ‘enemy combatant’ and what
is a ‘war crime’; so long as the political context in which rights reside can be redefined,
so, too, can the rights themselves.” Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the
Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1740 (2009). As William Fenrick has
observed,
As a general statement, although it is relatively easy to identify which types of acts con-
stitute war crimes, it is often quite difficult to spell out the elements of individual
offenses because substantial portions of international humanitarian law are expressed
at a high level of abstraction or generality and because many offenses have rarely, if ever,
been prosecuted in criminal courts. This problem is particularly apparent where the law
of the Hague is concerned.
William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 772 (1999).
193. See United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal –  Annex to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis (“London Agreement”), art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b39614.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).  The charter governing the
Tokyo trials of Japanese leaders contained a very similar laundry list.
194. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
195. Id. art. 1.
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blockades, airstrikes, and more capacious and arguable provisions such as
“allowing [ ] territory . . . to be used by [another] State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third,” or “substantial involvement” in the “send-
ing” of “armed bands.”196  The resolution has unsurprisingly been criti-
cized ever since as “both too narrow and too broad.”197
International criminal lawyers hoped that the meaning of the interna-
tional crime of aggression would be settled by the international process
that defined international criminal law and created a tribunal to interpret
and enforce it.198  But, while the Rome Statute listed the crime of aggres-
sion as a cause of action over which the ICC would have jurisdiction, it was
not until 2010 that the meaning of the term “aggression” was defined.199
Then, at a Rome Statute review conference held in Uganda, the parties to
the statute, after years of debate and negotiation, settled— after a fashion—
on a definition.200  Article 8 bis defines the crime of aggression as, among
other things, “the planning, preparation, and initiation or execution, by a
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct a politi-
cal or military activity of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its char-
acter, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the charter of
the United Nations.”201  The article also includes a laundry list of activities
that do qualify, ranging from invasion to infiltration.202
In this way, although international criminal law is both at the heart
and at the cutting edge of public international law, the parallels between its
form of governance and that of IFR are striking even as the provenance of
their legality differentiates them.  Aggression remains one of the least
defined and most debated aspects of international criminal law, and while
this Article is not the place to try to sort out what, precisely, aggression is
or should be, its indeterminateness is one of its features.  This ambiguity is
one of the reasons why the development of international criminal law pro-
vokes support (because of the idea that it can potentially evolve), and oppo-
sition (for the same reason).203  And if that is the case, it underscores the
196. Id. art 3.
197. VALERIE EPPS & LORIE GRAHAM, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 11.2.4 (2011).
198. See David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 111, 117, 119 (2008).
199. See id. at 119.
200. For a discussion, see Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Com-
promise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1180 (2010).
201. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed Seventh Session Feb.
9– 13, 2009, Annex I, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
at 11, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009).
202. Id.
203. An American example of skepticism is provided by Jack Goldsmith’s embrace of
the term “lawfare,” which in his view is the use of criminal and other tools of interna-
tional law to disempower American foreign policy. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESI-
DENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58– 59 (2007).  As Susan
Carle has explained, the concept comes from Donald Rumsfeld: “The overarching theme
Professor Goldsmith wants to promote, echoing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s
concept of “lawfare,” is that government actors find themselves in a bind when they are
forced to juggle political pressures to be effective along with liability concerns that con-
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parallels between the negotiated and debated nature of informal interna-
tional regulation like IFR and the much more formal public international
law represented by the Rome Statute and its court.
Just as with financial regulation, state interest goes into this negotia-
tion. Despite the creation of dispute resolution processes and tribunals,
much of what international criminal law is also turns on its own stylized
process of peer review, whereby multiple states act in judgment of the
delicts committed by their peer states in the dock.  The similarities go on
from there— just as IFR is developed through financial crises, the mecha-
nisms of criminal law have been prompted by atrocities.
The iterative nature of important concepts is not just limited to defini-
tion.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia handled a differ-
ent set of war crimes cases than did the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, with the ICTY focusing more on leaders, and the ICTR on mid-
level participants in the hostilities.204
Accordingly, the nature of the debates in IFR or in international crimi-
nal law need not look like an unrealistically pious search for truth.  In both
cases, of course, state interest play important roles in determining content
and participation.  The United States has stayed out of the ICC because it
worries about the consequences for its soldiers posted abroad.205  Ameri-
can regulators, along with their British counterparts, first pursued a capital
adequacy agreement in IFR because the American and British banking
industries were worried that they would be unable to compete with large
Japanese banks.206  No one would suggest that, simply because IFR and
international law work through contestation and disagreement, that self-
interest is abandoned.  Indeed, self-interest explains why the dialogue is
constant and the disagreements often sharp.
Moreover, the contestation is underscored by the consensus orienta-
tion of both IFR and international law more generally.  The constant
undercurrent of debate and revisitation; the need to convince everyone
most of the time, is a feature of both IFR and international law.  For IFR,
the taste appears to be driven by the desire for harmonization, the need to
motivate domestic agencies to want such harmonization, and the inclina-
tion to ensure a buy-in.207  International law’s preference for consensus is
strain their actions.” Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1339
(2008).
204. Morten Bergsmo, Catherine Cisse´ & Christopher Staker, The Prosecutors of the
International Tribunals: The Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and
ICTR, and the ICC Compared, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT 121 (1999).
205. Or so, at least, has been the conclusion of Congress, which passed the Ser-
vicemember’s Protection Act for this reason.  “The Act was designed to prevent United
States participation in the ICC and to discourage other members of the international
community from participating in the Court or assisting it in any way.”  Lilian V. Faulha-
ber, American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537 (2003).
206. Or so argues Singer. See Singer, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
207. As I have elsewhere observed, international financial regulators act “on a con-
sensus basis using general principles, meaning that the regulatory regime offered to
extend to any particular regulator applies to all of the members. The consensus format
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presumably rooted in its (not always explicable) commitment to the idea of
sovereign equality of nations, the idea that Vanuatu and China are func-
tionally similar in the eyes of the law.208  In both cases, the desire for con-
sensus is driven by the horizontal nature of global governance.209
This insight is not meant to be fundamental rethinking of what inter-
national law is all about.  Instead, it aims merely to remind legal scholars
that despite the predilection for doctrinal analysis, and particularly for the
doctrinal analysis of insecure international lawyers, precision and reduc-
tion to writing have often been favored. But in reality, international govern-
ance happens through imprecision and constant revisitation.
Conclusion
Because of the importance of coordination, contestation, and domes-
tic institutions, international law looks more like international financial
regulation than one might expect.  The comparison underscores the hori-
zontal nature of international legal obligation and emphasizes the way that
soft law, in the international system, has more similarities to hard law than
one might expect, given that the concepts were conceived as opposites.210
These insights are the kind still ignored by leading textbooks of interna-
of financial regulation appears to be rooted in an aversion to the types of side deals that
international regulators might otherwise make.”  David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in
Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685, 708 (2012). See also Joseph J. Norton,
Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for International
Standards, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 817, 857 (1998) (mentioning that the Basel Committee’s
uses of consensus methods has had some positive results); TONY PORTER, STATES, MAR-
KETS, AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 66– 67 (1993) (stating that while the process of the
Basel Committee is clouded in secrecy, it does rely on consensus); David Zaring, Inter-
national Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 478 (2010) (discuss-
ing the consensus phenomenon).
208. “[I]nternational law accommodates developing countries because the system
operates on a principle of consensus.” Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The
Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 183, 193
(2003). See also William C. Bradford, International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of
Interstate War in the Twentieth Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associa-
tive Relationship, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647, 741 (2001) (arguing that international law
“binds states only to the degree that consensus is maintained.”)
209. See Elke Krahmann, National, Regional, and Global Governance: One Phenomenon
or Many?, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 323, 338 (2003).
210. For other works along this line of reasoning, see Gidon Gottlieb, The Nature of
International Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER 331– 32 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1972) (arguing for a
concept of law that acknowledges horizontal systems and that thus accounts for interna-
tional law); OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS ROLE IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 5– 6 (1951) (stating that interna-
tional law is enforced primarily in a horizontal, rather than vertical, manner); cf. Lea
Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277,
2280 (1991) (“the distinction between horizontal and vertical interpretations of interna-
tional law is already implicit in the case law. In this sense, the horizontal/vertical dis-
tinction is old wine in new bottles.”); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 476 (2001) (noting that “in most
areas of the law, states have obligations without either the possibility or probability that
they might be called before an international court”).
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tional law.  But they have not always been.  The New Haven School argued
that international law was more than doctrine, and should better be under-
stood as a process of authoritative decisionmaking. Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell, the founders of the school, wrote that “our chief interest is
in the legal process, by which we mean the making of authoritative and
controlling decisions.”211  And their disciples agreed. “[I]nternational law
is most realistically observed, not as a mere rigid set of rules but as the
whole process of authoritative decision in which patterns of authority and
patterns of control are appropriately conjoined,” argued Eisuke Suzuki.212
No less an authority than World Court judge Rosalyn Higgins agreed that
“international law is a process, a system of authoritative decision-mak-
ing, . . . a process for resolving problems.”213
It is an attractive approach to international law— rather than seeking
doctrine where the doctrine is necessarily contested (and always has been,
when it comes to international law), the New Haven school sensibly
inquired what would be the organs making those decisions that are seen as
legally required.
By the same token, it is the process of transforming international pol-
icy to domestic regulation that illustrates the critical role of sub-state actors
in making international law, in either its hard or soft variants, into any sort
of law at all.  The process of coordination around a mutually beneficial
standard is also a turn to process, rather than content.  The continual
debate and revision of principles, too, is a function of process, rather than
any particular piece of substantive regulation.
The New Haven School has largely been forgotten because of its inabil-
ity to pick from far too many methods of investigating the international
211. MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1987); Myres S.
McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOC-
TRINE AND THEORY 103 113 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); G. L.
Dorsey, The McDougal Laswell Proposal to Build a World Public Order, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
41 (1998); Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary
Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157 (1953). See also David Kennedy, My Talk at
the ASIL: What is New Thinking in International Law?, 94 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 104
(2000) (defining international law “as a lived professional practice, as an intellectual
discipline, as the culture developed by international lawyers to speak about what they
see as the political and social world around them”).
212. Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a
Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 30 (1974). See also John
Norton Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lass-
well, 54 VA. L. REV. 662, 667 (1968) (“the most useful conception of law is a broad one
encompassing the entire process by which judges, legislators, litigants and many others
pursue particular values through the whole panoply of authoritative community deci-
sion-making.”).
213. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: International Law and How we Use it
267 (1994). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Is There A “New” New Haven School of Interna-
tional Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 573 (2007) (“The New Haven school does not
describe the world’s different community decision processes through a dichotomy of
national and international law, in terms of the relative supremacy of one system of rules
or other interrelations of rules. Instead, it describes them in terms of the interpenetra-
tion of multiple processes of authoritative decision of varying territorial compass.”)
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system.  Its explicitly utopian streak did it little good.  But process need not
be only interrogated with a value system favoring world peace at its
forefront.
The New Haven School recognized that international legal procedure
is what it is: fuzzy, varied, and often, quite ad hoc.  It is similarities in
process that animates each of the three lessons IFR has for public interna-
tional law considered in this Article.  As it turns out, IFR depends upon
domestic agencies, the values of coordination, and a commitment to updat-
ing that renders it rather unfixed.  Those characteristics animate a great
deal of international law as well.
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